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Chapter 5
Croatia: stability amidst heterogeneous collective 
bargaining patterns
Dragan Bagić
It is diﬃ  cult to describe the main features of the collective bargaining system in the 
Republic of Croatia because there is no uniform collective bargaining system. There is 
no dominant pattern of collective bargaining regarding the level at which it is conducted, 
collective bargaining cycles, the content of collective agreements and the relationship 
between agreements concluded at diﬀ erent levels. Instead, at least three diﬀ erent 
patterns of collective bargaining can be identifi ed. The fi rst is characterised by collective 
bargaining that takes place exclusively at industry level, without additional agreements 
at lower levels. In this pattern, which predominates in the public sector, including 
education, health care and state administration, wage provisions are not strictly defi ned. 
The second pattern is characterised by bargaining at industry and company level. It is 
found primarily in construction and tourism, in which, in addition to industry-level 
agreements concluded by industry-level trade unions and employers’ organisations, 
company collective agreements are signed in a large number of companies. The third 
pattern is characterised by bargaining at only the company level. It is present in public 
and private companies outside sectors with a tradition of industry-level collective 
bargaining. 
The main characteristic of collective bargaining developments over the past 15 years, as 
set out in Table 5.1, is their relative stability despite several challenges such as the global 
economic and fi nancial crisis starting in 2009 and, not least, the country’s  accession 
to the EU in July 2013. With the exception of a few industries, collective bargaining 
patterns in the economy as a whole did not change between 2000 and 2016. One 
exception is the retail industry, in which collective bargaining ‘moved’ from the second 
pattern of multi-level bargaining to the third pattern of decentralised company-level 
bargaining. This change in the retail industry largely explains the decrease in collective 
bargaining coverage, from approximately 65 per cent in 2000 to 53 per cent in 2016. 
The overall stability of collective bargaining in Croatia for the past couple of decades is 
due mainly to the consolidation of the main industrial relations actors and the country’s 
economic structure after dramatic changes during the transition period in the 1990s. As 
illustrated in Table 5.1, between 2000 and 2016, the density of employers’ associations 
remained roughly the same and, even though union density declined from just under 
40 per cent in 2000 to below 25 per cent in 2016, it is still the highest in all the post-
communist countries (see Table A1.H).
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Industrial relations context and principal actors
The characteristics of the collective bargaining system in the Republic of Croatia today 
were established relatively gradually in the period from 1990 until 2000. The main 
reasons for the relatively long formation process are to be found mainly in the economic 
and political transition, which was strongly aﬀ ected by the war of independence 
(‘Homeland War’) and its consequences,1 and by the authorities’ focus on nation-
building during the transition process. The fi rst Labour Act (Zakon o radu, ZOR), which 
defi ned the employment relationship as a contractual and market relationship between 
a worker and an employer, came into force as late as early 1996: that is, more than fi ve 
years after the formal abandonment of the socialist system. 
Collective bargaining had begun before the adoption of the Labour Act, which regulated 
that area in detail. In September 1991 the democratically elected government and the 
three trade union confederations signed the fi rst agreement, which can be considered the 
framework collective agreement.2 This agreement set the framework for the conclusion 
of general national collective agreements, which regulate workers’ fi nancial and other 
rights. The fi rst general national collective agreement for employees in private and 
state-owned companies was signed in July 1992. It defi ned the rules for harmonising 
wage developments in accordance with infl ation, which in 1992 stood at 938 per cent 
on an annualised basis. In October 1992 a similar agreement was signed for public and 
state employees: for example, schools, hospitals, police and state administration. In 
1. It has to be borne in mind that around one-third of national territory was occupied and signifi cant parts of it 
were directly aﬀ ected by the war, which had devastating consequences for the economy and the labour market. 
The Croatian authorities established full control over the whole territory only as late as in 1998.
2. At that time, the majority of the economy was still state-owned and privatisation was still not implemented 
on a large scale. Therefore, the government was an indirect employer to the majority of the workforce. Mass 
privatisation started in 1994.
Table 5.1 Principal characteristics of collective bargaining in Croatia
Key features 2000 2016
Actors entitled to collective bargaining Trade unions and employers or em-
ployers’ associations
Trade unions and employers or em-
ployers’ associations
Bargaining levels There is no uniform system; it diff ers by sector. In the public sector negotiations 
take place at sectoral or company level, while in the majority of private sector 
ﬁ rms negotiations take place at company level
Favourability principle/possibilities 
to derogate from (cross-) sectoral 
agreements
Yes. Favourability principle is absolute, there is no possibility to derogate rights 
at lower level
Collective bargaining coverage (%) ≈65 53
Extension mechanism (or functional 
equivalent)
Yes, by decision of minister of labour, 
if both sides request it 
Yes, by decision of minister of labour, 
if test of public interest is positive 
Trade union density (%) ≈38 <25
Employers’ association density (%) ≈50 per cent of employees in the private sector work in companies that are a 
member of an employers’ association
Sources: Bagić (2013). 
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principle, the conclusion of the two agreements regulated the basic rights of almost all 
workers in Croatia and the formal coverage of the two collective agreements was over 90 
per cent.3 The conclusion of the general collective agreement also created the conditions 
for the conclusion of collective agreements at industry level. In the next couple of years, 
a dozen industry-level collective agreements were signed. In the early phase of the 
transition therefore a centralised and coordinated system of collective bargaining was 
established, similar to the one in Slovenia (Stanojević 2003; see Chapter 26). From 
the mid-1990s, however, a more decentralised and uncoordinated system emerged. The 
main forces behind this signifi cant shift in the model of collective bargaining compared 
with the early phases of the transition period can be found in trade union fragmentation 
and signifi cant changes in the structure of the economy in the second half of the 
1990s. In particular the latter involved changes in the relative importance of diﬀ erent 
sectors and in the share of medium-sized and large companies. Several very important 
industries, such as metal and garments, almost disappeared in this process. At the same 
time, a signifi cant number of large companies were eliminated or fragmented, and 
numerous small businesses opened. The far-reaching deindustrialisation and the rise of 
SMEs changed the economic context of industrial relations. The processes behind those 
changes in the economic structure were the war, a deep economic crisis and ‘tycoon’ 
privatisation.4 After economic turbulence during second half of the 1990s, the structure 
of the economy stabilised. Today, the structure of the Croatian economy is aligned 
with that of other developed and medium-developed countries. This means that most 
economic activity and employment are concentrated in services, which accounts for 
about 66 per cent of employment, with a particularly high share in tourism; followed by 
industry, which comprises about a quarter of employment; while agriculture accounts 
for only about 7 per cent of employment.
On the other hand, the industrial relations cast of characters has been relatively 
stable since the mid-1990s. As regards trade unions, the main feature is the high level 
of fragmentation, initially based on ideological lines between new unions and reformed 
socialist unions and later by the establishment of company-level unions. In the early 
years of transition, more than 100 new trade unions were established, making a total 
of about 630 unions by 2016. The majority of these trade unions are company-level 
trade unions. As industry-level trade unions, most of the former socialist trade unions 
survived, transformed into modern trade unions. Industry-level and company unions 
are organised in four national union confederations: the Union of Autonomous Trade 
Unions of Croatia (Savez samostalnih sindikata Hrvatske, SSSH), the Independent Trade 
Unions of Croatia (Nezavisni hrvatski sindikati, NHS), the Association of Croatian Trade 
Unions (Matica hrvatskih sindikata, MHS) and the Croatian Association of Workers’ 
Unions (Hrvatska udruga radničkih sindikata, HURS). The trade union confederations 
3. In formal and legal terms, the only two sectors not covered by the two collective agreements were crafts and 
 agriculture. Those two sectors were dominated by self-employment and so the vast majority of dependent 
employees were formally covered by the two general collective agreements.
4. ‘Tycoon privatisation’ is a term often used in scholarly and general public discourse to describe the dominant 
model of privatisation in Croatia and some other South-East European countries. The model implies the 
concentration of ownership of companies in the hands of a small number of individuals who are close to 
the political establishment and gained ownership under suspicious circumstances. Individual tycoons have 
concentrated ownership in various industries without clear synergy and intent mainly on extracting wealth from 
these companies in as short a time as possible (for example, by selling real estate and machinery) (Županov 
2001).
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do not have a direct role in collective bargaining, but through their involvement in 
tripartite social dialogue they exert infl uence on the legislation regulating collective 
bargaining.
In contrast, the employers’ side is highly consolidated. Since 1993 there has been only 
one’ association, the Croatian Employers’ Association (Hrvatska udruga poslodavaca, 
HUP), which aﬃ  liates employers’ industry-level and interest representing associations. 
Because industry-level negotiations exist only in two or three sectors, HUP and the 
majority of its industry-level associations are not involved in collective bargaining and 
focus mainly on lobbying for business interests within tripartite social dialogue. 
Extent of bargaining
According to the most recent available data (end of 2014), the rights of about 650,000 
workers in the Republic of Croatia are regulated by one or several collective agreements, 
which gives a bargaining coverage of around 53 per cent (Bagić 2016). There is, however, 
great variation in the level of coverage depending on type of employer and predominant 
ownership. The highest collective bargaining coverage (88 per cent) is in the public sector, 
including state and local administration and public services, such as public education, 
health care and culture. In public companies that are in majority ownership of the state 
or local and regional self-administrations, the collective bargaining coverage is around 
75 per cent. Bargaining coverage in private companies is considerably lower, amounting 
to only about 36 per cent. Nevertheless, there are also considerable diﬀ erences within 
the private sector depending on the industry and the size of the company. 
With regard to industry, collective bargaining coverage ranges from 100 per cent 
in construction and catering and tourism to only 2 per cent in the sector of expert, 
scientifi c and technical activities. The complete coverage in construction and catering 
and tourism is due to industry-level collective agreements, which have been extended 
to all workers and employers by a decision of the labour minister. In manufacturing 
industry coverage is around 39 per cent, while in retail it is considerably lower, at a 
Table 5.2 Bargaining coverage by ownership sector, 2014
Sector Coverage
Public administration and services  88.3%
Central government  100.0%
Local government  17.7%
Public enterprises  74.8%
Central government owned  77.5%
Local government owned  67.4%
Private employers  35.5%
Total  52.8%
Source: Bagić (2016).
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mere 8 per cent. Coverage in banking and fi nance is above average for the private sector, 
at around 36 per cent.  
Given that there is no settled system for monitoring data on collective bargaining 
coverage, it is not possible to ascertain trends. The last comprehensive analysis was done 
in 2009 and yielded overall coverage of around 61 per cent (Bagić 2010), which means 
that in the fi ve-year period from 2009 until 2014 there was a substantial decrease of 
collective bargaining coverage of 8 percentage points. The main reason for this decrease 
was the cancellation of the industry-level agreement for retail, which was extended to 
all workers in the sector.5 Because the retail sector employs around one-sixth of the total 
workforce, the cancellation of that industry-level collective agreement decreased overall 
coverage signifi cantly. The second important factor explaining the negative trend are 
the negative employment eﬀ ects of the economic crisis in construction and catering and 
tourism, the two sectors with 100 per cent coverage.
As a regular practice, industry-level collective bargaining has been established only in 
some industries, and there are structural obstacles to greater coverage at the industry 
level, on the side of both trade unions and employers. As regards trade unions, the 
key reasons are the highly fragmented union structure and the fact that company-level 
trade unions predominate. Industry-level unions exist only in those areas that were 
developed during socialism, and only in some of these areas was industry-level collective 
bargaining retained. The main structural obstacle to the development of industry-level 
collective bargaining on the employers’ side is the fact that diﬀ erent industry-level 
employers’ associations use diﬀ erent defi nitions of the ‘industry of activity’. This leads to 
a lack of coordination and mismatch between trade unions and employers’ associations 
as regards their organisational domain, which hinders the establishment of any kind of 
social dialogue at industry level, and especially of collective bargaining.
Another explanation for the signifi cant sectoral variation in collective bargaining 
coverage are the sectoral diﬀ erences in trade union density. According to the most 
recent research (from 2014) overall trade union density in the Republic of Croatia was 
26 per cent, although with signifi cant diﬀ erences depending on type, sector of activity 
and size of employer (see Table 5.3).6 Trade union density in the private sector varies 
considerably depending on company size and area of activity. In large companies, union 
density is higher than 30 per cent, in medium-sized companies around 15 per cent and 
in small companies signifi cantly below 10 per cent. 
The administrative extension of collective agreements to all employers in an industry 
plays an important role in collective bargaining coverage, especially in the private 
sector. At the end of 2014, the two extended industry-level collective agreements, in 
construction and catering and tourism, formally applied to approximately 140,000 
5. According to the Labour Act (Oﬃ  cial Gazette No. 93/2014), the labour minister may extend a collective 
agreement if so demanded by all the signatories to the collective agreement. The decision to extend the 
collective agreement to those employers that are not members of the employers’ association which signed the 
collective agreement is based on the minister’s judgement of whether extension is in the public interest.
6. The results of the author’s unpublished research carried out on a nationally representative sample of 2,000 
respondents.
Dragan Bagić
98  Collective bargaining in Europe
workers. This was about 50 per cent of the private sector workforce covered by collective 
agreements. Although the extension mechanism still plays a relatively important role, 
its signifi cance has decreased over time. Ten years ago, at least six industry-level 
agreements were extended, including the collective agreement for retail. The number of 
extended agreements decreased because some agreements were cancelled, but at least 
two industry-level agreements are no longer extended because of changes in the Labour 
Act (ZOR) in 2014. The new Labour Act cancelled all previous extension decisions and 
defi ned new and stricter criteria for extension. According to the new criteria, the decision 
to extend a collective agreement is taken by the minister, based on an obligatory test 
of public interest. It is no longer enough if the signatory trade union and employers’ 
association submit a joint request for the extension of an agreement. These changes, as 
well as the redefi nition of the validity of collective agreements after expiry, were at least 
partially infl uenced by the European Commission, which in several reports on Croatia’s 
macroeconomic situation suggested a restructuring of the collective bargaining system 
in order to make it more responsive to economic change. 
In general, we can conclude that in the Republic of Croatia there is no uniform 
pattern of collective bargaining with regard to type of agreement in terms of duration, 
bargaining cycles and dynamics of amendments. Roughly, we can distinguish four 
diﬀ erent patterns of collective bargaining in terms of their dynamics and duration. The 
fi rst comprises agreements concluded for a defi nite period, usually for a year or two, 
which are common in multinationals or big domestic companies. The second includes 
agreements concluded for a defi nite but longer period of four or fi ve years, and are 
found in the public sector and in public companies. Unlike the fi rst pattern, this type 
of collective agreement is characterised by relatively frequent changes during the 
term of the agreement. The third pattern comprises dynamic agreements concluded 
for an indefi nite period, but often updated through amendments that refl ect changes 
in economic circumstances, a pattern common in privatised companies. The fourth 
pattern comprises relatively inert collective agreements concluded for an indefi nite 
period that are rarely or never changed. 
Security of bargaining
Security of bargaining concerns factors that determine the bargaining role of trade 
unions, such as legislation on union recognition or strikes. According to the Labour Act 
(ZOR), trade unions are the only actors entitled to conclude collective agreements on 
behalf of workers in the Republic of Croatia. On the employers’ side, a party to a collective 
Table 5.3 Union density by sector, 2014
Sector Coverage
Public administration and services 45.9
Public enterprises 52.8
Private sector 11.5
Source: author’s unpublished research.
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agreement can be an individual employer or an employers’ association. Works councils 
also have the right to negotiate agreements with the employer, but these agreements 
must not regulate matters related to wages, duration of working time and other issues, 
which the Labour Act stipulates may be regulated by a collective agreement. In this way 
trade unions are ensured a collective bargaining monopoly. Because Croatian labour 
legislation associates the right to strike primarily with collective bargaining, trade 
unions are thus also guaranteed a monopoly on the right to strike. The right to bargain 
collectively, and thus the right to strike in relation to collective bargaining, is restricted 
to representative trade unions in line with the criteria defi ned in the Croatian Act on 
the representativeness of employers’ associations and trade unions (Oﬃ  cial Gazette 
No. 93/2014). Trade unions can organise a legal strike for three reasons: fi rst, in 
relation to collective bargaining, as a means of putting pressure on an employer to start 
negotiations or during negotiations as a means of pushing through their bargaining 
agenda; second, in case of non-payment of wages to workers in a regular timeframe; 
and third, as a solidarity strike with workers employed by other employers who are on 
strike for one of the two other reasons named above.
Against the background of the highly fragmented trade union movement, the question 
of whether trade unions should have the right to take part in collective bargaining has 
been a matter of dispute among trade unions since the beginning of the transition. The 
fi rst Labour Act adopted in 1995 did not adequately regulate this issue, which led to 
repeated confl icts among trade unions about the composition of trade union bargaining 
committees. The situation improved in 2012 following the adoption of the fi rst law 
regulating the criteria and procedure for determining trade union representativeness 
for collective bargaining (Potočnjak 2016). 
If there is competition between unions where collective bargaining is conducted, unions 
can agree which of them are representative for bargaining purposes. If competing unions 
cannot reach an agreement, then every trade union may initiate a procedure to determine 
representativeness for collective bargaining, to be conducted by an independent 
commission (Representativeness Committee). In that procedure, representative status 
is granted to all unions representing at least 20 per cent of all unionised workers at the 
level at which collective bargaining is conducted (see Potočnjak 2016).
As is clear from the described legislative framework for collective bargaining, employers 
are not able to contest the trade union right to collective bargaining. Only trade unions 
may contest the right to bargain collectively with other trade unions if they think they 
are not representative. Employers, however, are not obliged to conclude a collective 
agreement or to initiate collective bargaining, but trade unions have the right to 
exert pressure on employers through strikes in order to force the latter to enter into 
negotiations. Once a collective agreement has been concluded, both sides may cancel 
it before expiry; according to the Labour Act, a collective agreement may contain 
provisions on the validity of the agreement after it has expired. If not otherwise agreed, 
the agreement is valid for another three months after expiry.
Union membership is not a precondition for entitlement to any general social right. 
Workers who are not union members enjoy all entitlements that trade unions have 
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agreed in collective agreements. Some trade unions have long advocated measures 
to reduce the risk of free riding, in the form of a mandatory payment of a ‘solidarity 
contribution’ or a ‘bargaining fee’ for all who enjoy entitlements arising from collective 
agreements but who are not union members (see Barjašić Špiler and Šepak-Robić 2016). 
Level of bargaining
Due to the large variation across diﬀ erent industries, there is no uniformity in Croatia 
concerning bargaining level and links between diﬀ erent levels. Essentially, there are 
three main patterns with respect to the bargaining level. 
The fi rst pattern concerns public services, state administration and some other industries 
of the economy in which collective bargaining is conducted exclusively at industry 
level.7 In the case of public services, industry-level collective bargaining is conducted at 
two levels. First, the so-called ‘basic collective agreement for public services’ is signed, 
which regulates joint rights and obligations of workers in all centrally fi nanced public 
services. This is then followed by the conclusion of additional collective agreements for 
each industry, such as obligatory primary education, secondary education, science and 
higher education, social welfare, health care and culture. These agreements regulate 
matters that are specifi c to each segment of the public sector. As a rule, agreements at 
both levels have the same duration.8 In the private sector, this practice exists in only a 
small number of industries, such as health care services, in which collective agreements 
are regularly signed between the associations of private health care employers and 
trade unions. Because private employers who provide health care services are as a rule 
relatively small in terms of the number of workers employed, this model is practical for 
both employers and for trade unions. There is a similar practice also in the humanitarian 
demining sector,9 but in recent years there have been interruptions of the regular cycle 
of bargaining. This model could also cover retail because there was an industry-level 
collective agreement from 1998 until 2013, which was only exceptionally supplemented 
by additional collective agreements at company level.10  
7. Workers employed in centrally fi nanced state administration and public services formally have diﬀ erent 
employers, individual institutions or establishments (hospitals, schools, theatres and so on). This is why in 
Croatia it is common to classify collective agreements that regulate the rights of state employees and public 
services employees as industry-level collective agreements because they formally regulate the rights of the 
employees with a larger number of separate employers. It has to be added that this classifi cation is questionable, 
however, because the signatory to all these agreements on the employer side is the government of the Republic 
of Croatia, and not the employers’ association.
8. Such a collective bargaining system for public services was established in the early 2000s; in the past 15 years, 
however, there have been situations in which ‘the cycle has been broken’ at those two levels, in such a way that 
at a certain point only agreements at one of the two levels was in force. The coordination of these two levels was 
re-established in 2012. The fact that at some point in time only one of the agreements at the two levels was in 
force led to a situation in which the provisions of the basic agreement were as a rule repeated in the industry-
level agreements for individual public services.
9. After the war of independence, mines covered large parts of Croatian territory. After the war, a signifi cant 
eﬀ ort had to be made to clear those areas of mines and that job is still not fi nished. As the government and 
international donors continually have to fund demining, a separate industry has developed comprising dozens 
of companies and several thousand employees.
10. Apart from the industries mentioned, this pattern of bargaining to a certain degree also applies to the wood and 
paper industry and tourist agencies, which are two industries with valid, though relatively outdated industry-
level agreements that are complemented by company-level agreements in only a very small number of cases.
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The second pattern refers to industries such as construction and catering and tourism 
in which bargaining takes place at two levels, the industry level and the company 
level. In these two industries industry-level collective agreements are extended to all 
employers. In the large companies of these two industries, however, there is a tradition 
of concluding company-level agreements in addition to the industry-level agreement. 
At the end of 2014, in the construction industry there were an industry-level collective 
agreement and 36 company-level collective agreements; in the tourism industry there 
were 91 company-level agreements in addition to the industry-level agreement. This 
is the only pattern of collective bargaining in which there is a challenge concerning 
the  articulation and harmonisation of rights at diﬀ erent bargaining levels. In line 
with the favourability principle stipulated in the Labour Act (ZOR), it is always the 
most favourable right that applies to a worker and it is not possible for lower-level 
agreements to derogate from industry-level agreements. Consequently, it only makes 
sense to conclude a collective agreement at company level if the employer is prepared to 
grant better conditions to workers than those agreed in the industry-level agreement; 
or if there is a need to regulate some issues that have not been regulated adequately by 
the industry-level agreement. Although there are similarities in these two industries 
as regards the formal relationship between industry- and company-level agreements, 
there is no harmonisation in terms of the scope of issues dealt with. For example, 
basic wages for individual job types have not been regulated by the industry-level 
collective agreement for the tourism and catering industry, while the agreement for the 
construction industry defi nes a minimum wage for each job category.
The third pattern includes those industries in which collective bargaining takes place 
solely at the company level. Because industry-level bargaining is conducted in only a 
very limited range of industries (see above), this pattern covers most of the economy, 
including private and public companies. Apart from bargaining level, it is diﬃ  cult to fi nd 
other similarities in this pattern, whether in terms of scope or the cycle and dynamics 
of bargaining.
Measured in terms of bargaining coverage, the fi rst bargaining pattern is the most 
important one, accounting for around 43 per cent of total coverage. The third pattern, 
company-level bargaining only, is the second largest, with a share of 35 per cent of 
overall bargaining coverage; and the second pattern of multi-level bargaining comes 
last, with a share of 22 per cent of total coverage. Without the extension mechanism, the 
share of the second pattern would be much lower. 
Because the three patterns have been relatively stable over the past 15 years, there is no 
clear trend towards the decentralisation of collective bargaining in Croatia, even though 
in the longer run the system has been considerably decentralised since the end of the 
1990s. The only more recent event that points towards decentralisation is the employers’ 
cancellation of the industry-level collective agreement in retail in 2012. More than 
three years of negotiations after its cancellation did not lead to a new industry-level 
agreement. The trade unions thus initiated collective bargaining at the company level 
in a number of companies, which, in turn, advanced the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining compared with the period before 2012. 
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Depth of bargaining
Depth of bargaining refers to the processes within trade unions related to the 
formulation of bargaining claims and, in particular, the involvement of the rank-
and-fi le. Unfortunately, in Croatia there has been no systematic research on internal 
union practices in collective bargaining processes. Based on information gathered for 
the purposes of this chapter,11 however, it is possible to identify several basic patterns 
depending primarily on the level at which collective bargaining is conducted. 
In the case of industry-level agreements, signed by industry-level trade unions, collective 
bargaining is relatively ‘shallow’; that is, the process of articulating trade union demands 
is dominated by the top-level national bodies of trade unions, without consulting 
lower levels and the membership. Members and lower levels of the organisation are 
usually informed only about the course of the negotiations, and the methods and 
intensity of information provision depend greatly on the profi le of the industry, which 
largely determines the type of communication channels that trade unions use.12 Upon 
conclusion of the bargaining process, the fi nal decision on a collective agreement is, as 
a rule, taken by the peak national bodies of industry-level trade unions. In the adoption 
phase of collective agreements, some trade unions tend to call a referendum in which 
all union members can state their opinion. This is occasionally practised by some trade 
unions in public services, but as a rule only if the employer insists on lowering certain 
workers’ rights. 
A somewhat deeper process of collective bargaining can be found in situations of 
company-level bargaining, with small diﬀ erences depending on whether it is the industry 
or company union that conducts the negotiations. The very fact that the collective 
bargaining is conducted at the level of one company implies greater involvement of 
the grassroots level in the bargaining process, or at least ‘closer’ relations between 
the decision-makers and the rank-and-fi le. The real depth of the consultation process 
varies here too, however, depending on the size and organisational complexity of the 
company, and it is somewhat deeper when a company union is bargaining. If collective 
bargaining at the company level is conducted by an industry trade union, the demands 
are formulated and bargaining conducted by the representatives of the local union in 
that company with the assistance of professionals from the national-level union. The 
fact that the local trade union leaders need to consult with the national level probably 
reduces their task to consultations with the membership. Lower levels of trade unions 
are more involved when the bargaining is conducted by the company-level union 
because there is no need for ‘upward’ consultations, which leaves room for ‘downward’ 
consultations. 
11. For the purposes of this chapter, the author interviewed seven trade union representatives active at diﬀ erent 
levels and taking part in collective bargaining at industry- and/or company level.
12. For example, trade unions that organise professionals and white-collar workers, who use computers and e-mail 
in their day-to-day work, can inform their members quickly and eﬃ  ciently via e-mails or newsletters. Those 
communication channels are less eﬃ  cient for trade unions who organise manual workers or workers in services 
because the majority of them does not use e-mail at their workplace, and many do not even use it for personal 
purposes.
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Deep collective bargaining, with the close involvement of all levels of the trade union 
organisation and members in the process of formulating trade union demands and 
bargaining positions, is relatively rare, although there are good practice examples. 
The Independent Trade Union of Road Workers (Nezavisni cestarski sindikat, NCS) 
is an example of collective bargaining with more depth, at least in the initial phase of 
formulating the demands. This trade union fosters very intensive consultations in the 
process of drafting preliminary bargaining positions.13 The process starts by inviting 
all members of a local union branch to propose provisions that need to be changed 
or regulated in the collective agreement. After that, a working group is set up, with 
representatives of various occupations in a company and of union headquarters, which 
drafts the preliminary bargaining positions. Then follow intensive consultations with 
the members at plant-level, presenting them with preliminary bargaining positions 
and collecting their proposals and comments. The fi nal union bargaining positions 
are then drafted on the basis of all the suggestions gathered. After consultation, the 
bargaining committee is authorised to bargain with the employer, and the agreed 
text of the collective agreement is not subject to confi rmation by the members. Such 
‘deep’ collective bargaining is probably the result of the union’s profi le and identity. 
This particular union has a strong activist orientation and is active in anti-corruption 
campaigns and campaigns against the privatisation of public goods, often in partnership 
with NGOs. 
The importance of internal trade union consultation processes, however, has 
diminished due to increased trade union pluralism. In about 40 per cent of cases, more 
than one trade union is recognised as representative at the level at which collective 
bargaining is conducted (Potočnjak 2016). This reduces the importance of internal trade 
union processes because the fi nal content of a collective agreement depends strongly 
on relations between the representative trade unions involved in the bargaining 
process. 
Scope of agreements
In line with labour legislation, working conditions and rights and duties of workers can 
be regulated by a collective agreement, or in some cases by an agreement between the 
works council and the employer, or by company statute, which is simply adopted by 
management. 
The structure of the majority of collective agreements is relatively harmonised; there 
are no great diﬀ erences in terms of the issues regulated. There may be diﬀ erences 
in the way certain rights are regulated, however. There are substantial diﬀ erences 
primarily in the regulation of wage level and structure. Three basic types of collective 
agreements can be distinguished, depending on how they regulate workers’ basic 
wages. The fi rst type are collective agreements in which the basic wage is not regulated 
by a collective agreement, either because an agreement does not contain any detailed 
wage provisions or because they are incomplete in that only one element of the wage 
13. On the basis of a phone interview with the trade union secretary.
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calculation is regulated in detail, for example the basis for the wage calculation, while 
the other elements, such as the specifi cation of wage brackets or the level of points 
for a job, are left to the employer’s discretion. This model can be found in collective 
agreements in public services, in the majority of agreements for public companies 
and in some industry-level collective agreements in the private sector. According to 
the collective agreement database, at the end of 2016 around 40 per cent of collective 
agreements belonged to this category.14 The second type of agreement contains 
concrete regulations on the basic wage ranges for several major groups of jobs, and 
the employer can autonomously determine the wage level for a job within a group. At 
the end of 2016, approximately 10 per cent of valid collective agreements belonged to 
this category. The third type of collective agreements are those that contain detailed 
wage provisions, which means that a collective agreement regulates the basic wage for 
the majority of jobs in detail. This type of collective agreement accounts for just under 
half of all valid agreements. 
The congruence between collective agreements is much stronger when it comes to other 
wage-related issues, such as various wage supplements and other material workers’ 
rights. Thus, in about 90 per cent of collective agreements there is a provision that the 
basic wage is increased for each year of service, usually 0.5 per cent a year. A similar 
percentage of collective agreements specify certain increments for work in atypical 
situations, including weekends and holidays, night work and shift work. Collective 
agreements in Croatia devote a lot of attention to various supplementary material 
rights. Research carried out in 2014 found that collective agreements typically regulate 
ten diﬀ erent categories of material rights, such as Christmas bonus, annual leave bonus 
and one-oﬀ  extraordinary payments (Bagić 2016).15 
Besides wages and material rights, collective agreements typically regulate issues related 
to the length and distribution of working time, as well as rules on leave and rest periods. 
These issues are regulated in 75–80 per cent of valid collective agreements, and how 
they are regulated depends greatly on the sector. Those issues are especially important 
in construction, tourism and trade. In tourism, which is particularly important to the 
Croatian economy, especially in coastal areas, the distribution of working time over the 
year is the key issue in tackling seasonality. In retail, the key issue is the distribution 
of weekly working time in order to regulate compensation for work during weekends, 
especially Sundays and holidays. 
In addition to these issues, recent collective agreements have increasingly regulated 
issues related to measures to combat discrimination against particular groups of 
14. The data gathered through analysis of the database of collective agreements of Saveza samostalnih sindikata 
Hrvatske (SSSH, the Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia), which at the time comprised around 200 
valid collective agreements. More information on the database is available at: http://www.kolektivni-ugovori.
info/
15. Diﬀ erent material rights can be grouped in the following categories: bonuses related to individual or group 
performance, supplements related to employee characteristics, supplements for work in diﬃ  cult working 
conditions, supplements that depend on the distribution of working hours, supplements that depend on the 
place where work is performed, regular payments on special occasions (Christmas bonus, annual leave bonus), 
one-oﬀ  extraordinary payments, severance pay, reimbursement of costs related to performing one’s job, other 
benefi ts.
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employees, bullying and protection of vulnerable groups of workers, such as older 
workers and pregnant workers. According to the SSSH collective agreement database, 
around a quarter of valid collective agreements deal with discrimination prevention 
measures, while about half of all agreements contain provisions on bullying. Usually 
there is an obligation for employers to appoint someone to be responsible for dealing 
with workers’ complaints regarding violations of their dignity. Approximately 45 per 
cent of collective agreements regulate measures and procedures for the protection of 
older workers, such as the employer’s obligation to move an older worker to a more 
adequate job in case of reduced work capacity. Company-level collective agreements 
increasingly include provisions on the role of trade unions and workers’ representatives 
in restructuring processes and/or changes to the company’s organisational or 
management structure. 
Degree of control of collective agreements
Degree of control of collective agreements concerns two main issues: fi rst, the extent 
to which agreed provisions on the rights and duties of workers and employers set the 
actual terms and conditions of employment; and second, mechanisms for controlling 
the implementation of collective agreements and compliance (Clegg 1976). Concerning 
the fi rst aspect, it is important to remember that in a large number of collective 
agreements some of the most important provisions on workers’ material rights are not 
strictly defi ned. As described above, the most important matter of collective bargaining, 
the level of the basic wage, has not been strictly and fully defi ned in about half of all 
the valid collective agreements. This applies in particular to industry-level collective 
agreements, which account for the largest share of the total collective bargaining 
coverage. On average, the degree of control of collective agreements is higher concerning 
other material rights, such as wage supplements, than concerning wages. For example, 
wage supplements, such as additional payments for work in atypical situations, are as a 
rule strictly regulated in 80 to 90 per cent of valid collective agreements. Furthermore, 
some 80 per cent of agreements strictly regulate the payment of jubilee awards, paid to 
workers for their loyalty to an employer (see more in Bagić 2016). 
The other component for assessing the degree of control of collective agreements 
concerns the implementation of agreements and mechanisms to monitor compliance. 
Here, two aspects are important: (i) the procedures agreed in a collective agreement and 
(ii) trade unions’ ability to monitor compliance in practice. The procedures of dispute 
settlement regarding agreement implementation are regulated in about two-thirds 
of valid agreements. As a rule, the dispute settlement procedure defi ned in collective 
agreements consists of three steps: fi rst, the two sides try to solve the dispute through 
negotiations, either by the standing body for monitoring and interpreting collective 
agreements or by an ad hoc bargaining committee; if the dispute is not settled in internal 
negotiations, it is taken before the external mediator, which involves a continuation of 
bargaining with mediation by a third party. If mediation does not settle the dispute, 
it is put before the  arbitration committee, whose decision is binding, but collective 
agreements defi ne in detail how the  arbitration committee is formed. 
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As regards trade unions’ capacity to monitor the implementation of collective 
agreements, the situation varies greatly depending on the level at which collective 
bargaining is conducted. As a rule, the unions’ monitoring capacity is somewhat weaker 
in the case of industry-level collective agreements because industry-level trade unions 
typically have local union branches only in the largest companies and generally not in 
small or medium-sized companies. This results in a much weaker capacity to monitor 
implementation in such companies. This applies particularly to collective agreements 
extended to the whole industry. To some extent, the absence of trade union branches 
is compensated by the existence of works councils, which are authorised to monitor 
the implementation of collective agreements. On the other hand, where collective 
bargaining is conducted at the company level, control is relatively eﬃ  cient because 
in such companies there are local unions and one or more trade union oﬃ  cers one of 
whose most important tasks is to monitor the implementation of collective agreements. 
Conclusions
The heterogeneous collective bargaining system gradually developed from the mid-
1990s and stabilised in the early 2000s. During the past 15 years, there have been no 
major structural changes as regards the patterns of collective bargaining set out in this 
chapter. Decentralisation of collective bargaining could be observed in some industries, 
such as retail, but this is not a general trend, especially because collective bargaining 
is already decentralised in large parts of the private sector. In some industries, such 
as humanitarian de-mining, collective bargaining has been abolished altogether, but 
again this is not an economy-wide trend. More recently, it was primarily the public 
sector that experienced stronger pressure on collective bargaining. Under pressure 
from the high budget defi cit and related EU procedures, central government has tried 
to cut wage-related costs in public administration and public services by reducing some 
material rights agreed in collective agreements. As unions were not ready to accept 
this, the government used its legislative power to abolish some rights of this kind. 
After stabilising the budget defi cit and a positive turn in economic indicators, however, 
regular collective bargaining practice was restored in the public sector.
Croatia’s  accession to the European Union, together with the process of harmonising 
legislation, did not have a substantial impact on the patterns of collective bargaining. 
Multinational companies have not infl uenced the established bargaining patterns in the 
past 15 years either, because their share in the Croatian economy did not signifi cantly 
increase during that period, with the exception of retail. This overall stability of 
collective bargaining during the past 15 years can be attributed to two key factors: 
fi rst, the stability of the main industrial relations actors and second, the stability of the 
structure of the Croatian economy in terms of the importance of particular industries, 
the share of the public sector and the number of large companies. 
Although collective bargaining coverage is relatively high compared with the majority 
of new EU Member States, the real eﬀ ect of collective agreements on wages is limited. 
As described above, the wages of about half the workers formally covered by collective 
agreements are not strictly defi ned by a collective agreement. Thus, the real eﬀ ect of 
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collective bargaining on working conditions and workers’ rights is lower than suggested 
by the formal coverage rate. On the other hand, in general, working conditions and 
material rights of workers covered by collective agreements are much better than those 
of workers who are not covered at all, who are employed mainly in small and medium-
sized private enterprises without a union branch or a works council. 
Future key challenges to the collective bargaining system in Croatia are linked primarily 
to the weakening of trade unions as a result of the rapid loss of members caused by 
the generational shift. Croatian trade unions have managed to retain part of their 
membership inherited from the socialist period, but now these cohorts are retiring, 
and trade unions are failing to recruit suﬃ  cient new members to compensate for the 
loss. Additional challenges may be posed by continued restructuring and privatisation 
of public companies, in which collective bargaining is well developed. At the time of 
writing (autumn 2018), however, it looks as if these challenges will, at least in the 
short run, not lead to major changes in the level of collective bargaining coverage or to 
changes in collective bargaining patterns.
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Abbreviations
HUP  Hrvatska udruga poslodavaca (Croatian Employers’ Association)
HURS  Hrvatska udruga radničkih sindikata (Croatian Association of Workers’ Unions)
MHS  Matica hrvatskih sindikata (Association of Croatian Trade Unions) and 
NCS  Nezavisni cestarski sindikat (Independent Trade Union of Road Workers)
NHS  Nezavisni hrvatski sindikati (Independent Trade Unions of Croatia), 
SSSH Savez samostalnih sindikata Hrvatske (Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of 
Croatia)
ZOR Zakon o radu (Labour Act) 
